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Examining Jesus’s Teachings on Violence, Judgment, 
and Punishment in the Gospel of Matthew 	  
Introduction 
There is no doubt that the Bible is filled with the concept of violence, especially in the New 
Testament, where Jesus faces the violence of persecution in his own life. There is also no doubt that 
the synoptic gospels each has its own way of addressing this violence: Mark responds to the 
violence with Jesus’s passivity, while Matthew, Luke, and John, each to their own extent, teach 
about non-retaliation and doing good to those who wrong you through their depictions of Jesus’s 
response to violence. Significantly, Matthew depicts Jesus’s response to violence in two different 
ways: first, Jesus teaches submission and peacemaking on earth, but when he speaks of his post-
resurrection return to the earth, he promises vengeance in the eschatological setting. These two 
different positions on violence create two contradictory versions of Jesus in Matthew: the peaceful, 
earthly Jesus, and the vengeful and violent eschatological Jesus. 
The Expectations of the Peaceful, Earthly Jesus 
 First, I will examine the teachings in the Gospel of Matthew of the earthly Jesus, who 
condemns retaliation and praises peace. In the beginning of Chapter 5 of Matthew, Jesus teaches his 
disciples, “Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the Earth” (The HarperCollins Study Bible, 
Matthew 5:5).  According to R.T. France’s commentary, this “[beatitude] commends those whom 
the world in general would dismiss as losers and wimps” (France 159) – or otherwise stated, 
submissive people, who bend to the will of others, without standing up for themselves. Furthermore, 
“meek” in this verse “speaks not only of those who are in fact disadvantaged and powerless [and 
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therefore, forced to submit], but also of those whose attitude is not arrogant and oppressive” (France 
166).  
In addition, according to W.D. Davies and D.C. Allison’s commentary on Matthew, “the 
word…‘meek’ was intended to make plain the religious dimension of ‘poor’ [used in Matthew 5:3]. 
Hence 5:3 and 5:5 are in synonymous parallelism. No real difference in meaning between the two is 
to be discerned” (Davies and Allison 1:449). In fact, they argue that “[i]n time, ‘poor’ came to be a 
self-designation for the meek, humiliated, and oppressed people of God…[for whom Jesus] 
promises salvation” (Davies and Allison 1:443). However, “[u]ntil the eschatological reversal takes 
place…mourning is heard because the righteous [or meek] suffer, because the wicked prosper, and 
because God has not yet acted to reverse the situation” (Davies and Allison 1:448). In these two 
beatitudes, Jesus draws a clear distinction between those who are meek or poor, and therefore 
submissive to the will of those who persecute or oppress them, and others, stating that those who are 
meek will be rewarded greatly, while the “‘wicked’ who have oppressed them [are] cut off” (France 
166). This is clearly desirable to Jesus’s followers, as they want to understand how to be accepted 
and rewarded by God, but they also struggle to “be content with the status quo” (Davies and Allison 
1:448) without the promise of some form of reward, or alternatively, vengeance.  
Jesus also states, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the Sons of God” 
(Matthew 5:9).  This beatitude emphasizes not only having a “peaceful disposition” – one must also 
make “an active attempt to ‘make peace,’ perhaps by seeking reconciliation with one’s own 
enemies, but also…overcoming the natural desire for advantage and/or retribution,” which is 
otherwise known as “lex talionis” (France 169). Davies and Allison argue that “‘[P]eacemaker’, not 
‘pacifist’ or ‘peaceful’, is the right translation of [the Greek text], for a positive action, 
reconciliation, is envisioned: the ‘peacemakers’ seek to bring about peace” (Davies and Allison 
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1:457). It is, however, important to note that Jesus teaches that not all conflict is avoidable, and 
being a peacemaker does not necessarily require being peaceful at all times. Instead, 
“peacemaking… implies assuming responsibility against all the odds, risking peacemaking out of a 
situation of powerlessness, and demonstrating the conviction that in the end God’s kingdom will 
prevail” (France 169) – again, emphasizing that the meek or powerless will be rewarded for 
pursuing peace and God’s will. This ties into Jesus’s later teachings in Matthew on how to respond 
to violence, especially his expectations of his followers’ responses to persecution. 
 Jesus’s earthly teachings in Matthew hold readers to an extremely high standard: to be 
rewarded by God, you must be a peacemaker, and you must be meek. However, Jesus’s 
expectations for his followers do not end there: he also expects his followers to respond to violence 
submissively and with kindness. For example, Jesus explains that although his disciples have been 
taught that murder is wrong, they are also expected not to get angry with anyone, as this too will 
lead to judgment against them. Jesus teaches that violent behavior is a sin, and any violent thoughts 
are just as sinful. This specific declaration speaks to intent, “[promoting] an ‘inward’ concern with 
motive and attitude above the ‘outward’ focus on the visible and quantifiable observance of 
regulations” (France 197).  Jesus teaches “that anger and insulting words [are] as deserving of 
punishment as murder” (Davies and Allison 1:516), and this implies that “anger and harsh words 
are made out to be not two human shortcomings among others but grievous sins to be exorcised at 
all costs,” just like murder (Davies and Allison 1:509). Therefore, Jesus’s declaration implies that 
intent matters as much as deed, and that if one’s intent or attitude is sinful, he is not truly following 
the will of God and will be punished at the time of the final judgment. Additionally, this declaration 
that “all wrongs against one’s neighbor are equally wrong” suggests that “it is foolish to make 
casuistic distinctions with regard to degrees of punishment” (Davies and Allison 1:515), which has 
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interesting implications for real-world applications. Of course, the inclusion of anger as a sin also 
poses an interesting challenge for human judgment in earthly courts, which will be examined later. 
In framing another expectation, Jesus explains: 
You have heard that it was said, “You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.” But I 
say to you, Love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, 
and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in 
heaven…For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have?...You therefore 
must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect. (Matthew 5:43-48)  
Here, Jesus prohibits not only violence, but also any attempts at proportionate retribution, and 
instead promotes “irenic relations between Christians and those outside the church, including 
opponents or enemies” (Davies and Allison 1:519). In addition, Jesus’s emphasis on loving one’s 
enemies “does not specify whether he is talking about personal hostility or about political enemies – 
which at that time would mean primarily the Roman occupying forces” (France 225). While 
Matthew 5:43 uses the singular “enemy” when explaining the old teachings, Jesus uses the plural 
“enemies” in 5:44, implying that “no class of enemy is excluded” and that “to love in the [New 
Testament] is not only a matter of emotion but also of an attitude which determines our behavior, 
acting for the good of the other” (France 225). This again emphasizes that intent and attitude 
matters equally as much as actions and behaviors. Jesus’s concern with intent is again exemplified 
by the ending clause of Matthew 5:44 – “pray for those who persecute you.” Here, it is your public 
submission to your persecution by others combined with private prayer that determines your 
goodness, thus emphasizing the importance of attitude and intent.  
This teaching sets an expectation that those who stand up for the will of God will be subject 
to persecution – as indeed has been the case according to R.T. France’s commentary, which states 
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that “those who have spoken out for God have always been liable to the violent reprisals of the 
ungodly. In light of that heritage, to be persecuted for the sake of Jesus is a badge of honor” (France 
173). Part of Jesus’s expectations for his followers is that they will be persecuted “because the 
message of God’s kingship is one which always has and always will lead to violent response from 
those who are threatened by it” (France 407), which again, in Matthew’s time would be the Roman 
occupying forces. However, Jesus’s teachings “[reflect] the conviction that revolution against Rome 
was the wrong course to take” (Davies and Allison 1:458), and Jesus suggests, “one is to love not 
only personal opponents but God’s opponents, the enemies of God’s people” (Davies and Allison 
1:551). According to France, Jesus expects his followers to face persecution submissively, thus “the 
prospect Jesus holds out before any ‘worthy’ disciple…[is] a savage death and public disgrace” 
(France 411). Indeed, Jesus promises reward for those who are persecuted, on the condition that 
they respond submissively and even benevolently to the violence against them.   
In addition, this passage “substitutes for what is in principle a one hundred percent 
achievable righteousness (the avoidance of breaking a definable set of regulations) a totally open-
ended ideal (being ‘perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect’) which will always remain beyond 
the grasp of the most committed disciple” (France 197). Thus, “life in strict accord with legal 
ordinances is not enough. God demands a radical obedience that cannot be casuistically formulated” 
(Davies and Allison 1:521). Jesus sets these expectations, knowing that it is an extremely high 
standard that most or even all people will not be able to achieve and that human judgment and legal 
systems will struggle to accommodate. Jesus defines these few people who actively respond to 
violence and hatred with love and good works as perfect, and this is what he expects his followers 
to strive for – indeed, a very high expectation to meet – perhaps even an impossible expectation, as 
“it is only the most sanguine of disciples (or those with little self-awareness) who can comfortably 
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attempt to simply put into practice this teaching” (France 195). While it may be impossible to fully 
commit to being as perfect as God, Jesus certainly gives his followers something to strive for, 
“[challenging] those who have accepted the demands of the kingdom of heaven to live up to their 
own commitment by being different from other people…to draw [their] standards of conduct not 
from what everyone else is doing, but from [their] heavenly Father” (France 224). Therefore, Jesus 
does not condemn those who are not perfect, but instead sets an expectation of at the very least an 
effort to be perfect as God is perfect. Jesus’s followers must try to prove their commitment to God 
by attempting to emulate godly conduct, even though many will fail. Those that try and fail will not 
necessarily be punished, but those that succeed will be greatly rewarded.  
Jesus further explains his expectations, stating, “You have heard that it was said ‘An eye for 
an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist the one who is evil. But if anyone 
slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also” (Matthew 5:38-39). This is an extreme form 
of pacifism, emphasizing submissiveness and non-retaliation, especially given that “[t]o slap 
another’s cheek was a serious insult…for which legal redress could be claimed…but to slap the 
right cheek required (if the assailant was right-handed) a slap with the back of the hand, which was 
far more insulting and would entail double damages” (France 220). This, of course, would not only 
be considered a physical assault, but “[i]n a culture that took honor and shame far more seriously 
than ours, this was a paradoxical and humiliating demand” (France 221). Jesus expects his followers 
to not only refrain from acting violently in the first place, but to also refrain from responding 
violently to violence against them, and to allow those who act violently against them to continue 
their violence by passively acquiescing, and forgiving them for their actions, instead of seeking the 
legal redress to which they would be entitled. After all, as Davies and Allison suggest, “How could 
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the meek, the merciful, the peacemakers, and those who are happy to suffer for the right cause strike 
back at their opponents?” (Davies and Allison 1:541). 
 Despite calling for his followers to be meek and to be peacemakers, Jesus paradoxically 
emphasizes a form of self-mutilation over committing violent acts against others. He says, “…if 
your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away. For it is better that you lose one of 
your members than that your whole body go into hell” (Matthew 5:30). While this pronouncement 
follows Jesus’s teachings on adultery, and therefore includes first a statement about the eye causing 
one to sin, this “shocking but well-recognized metaphor of self-mutilation…[i]n its Marcan context 
(Mark 9:43-48) and in its fuller Matthean use (18:8-9) does not have a specific reference to sexual 
desire” (France 206), and Matthew only “puts the saying about the eye before the saying about the 
hand because the link is with the lustful gaze in 5:28” (Davies and Allison 1:523). This idea is 
repeated later in Matthew, when Jesus similarly says, “And if your hand or your foot causes you to 
sin, cut it off and throw it away. It is better for you to enter life crippled or lame than with two 
hands or two feet to be thrown into the eternal fire” (Matthew 18:8). Both instances seem to apply 
to various forms of violent behavior, as the hand can be used to commit many violent acts, such as 
slapping as discussed previously, in addition to other sins, whether by hand, eye, or foot. Both 
instances emphasize that violence toward oneself would be preferable to violence against another. 
Jesus explains that violence against another would be a sin and would cause the sinner to go to hell - 
a more violent punishment than just the loss of a part of one’s body. While self-mutilation is a 
violent act, this teaching emphasizes Jesus’s earlier teachings about being a peacemaker toward 
others, and overcoming the human desire of lex talionis, while also remaining consistent with 
Jesus’s statement that it is better to enter life crippled than to be sent to hell for being violent against 
others. Whether one must cripple himself to prevent himself from violently sinning, or one must be 
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crippled – physically or metaphorically, in terms of one’s honor – by another’s violence, Jesus 
clearly states that either of these two scenarios is better than being sent to hell for acts of violence, 
even if that violence is only in retaliation to another’s violence.  
Moreover, when Peter asks just how tolerant one should be when another sins against him, 
specifically referencing “an individual’s response to personal injury” (France 699) and stating, 
“‘Lord, how often will my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?’” 
Jesus responds, “‘I do not say to you seven times, but seventy-seven times’” (Matthew 18:21-22). 
This hyperbolic response – France states that Peter’s suggestion of seven times “would probably 
have been regarded as ‘over the top’” and “an extreme proposal,” making “Jesus’s reply in v. 
22…more startling” (France 700) – highlights the submissiveness Jesus expects from his followers: 
one must allow others to sin against one without retaliation, and one must allow others to do as they 
please, even offering to accept further violence and to do good deeds for an enemy. These 
expectations require the disciples not to insist on their right to redress, whether physically with a 
defensive violent response, or legally with a request for damages.  
Jesus illustrates this expectation with the Parable of the Debtors, in which a king forgives 
the debt of a slave who does not have enough money to repay his debt, but when the slave meets a 
fellow slave who is indebted to him, he acts mercilessly and throws him in prison. When the king 
hears of the slave’s mercilessness, he turns him over to be tortured until he repays his debt 
(Matthew 18:22-35). The king in this parable was able to forgive the slave’s debt, but he could not 
forgive the slave’s clear proof of his unworthiness of the king’s mercy. Therefore, his punishment is 
a violent one. Interestingly, the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, changes the “torturers” (or 
the King James Version’s “tormentors”) to “jailers” – a revision that France claims is “misplaced,” 
as the slave’s “destiny is not detention but painful punishment” (France 708). The incidents 
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described in this parable are “a transparent symbol of eschatological judgment” (Davies and Allison 
2:803), and it is therefore clear that Jesus conceives of the punishment for those that do not forgive 
others as a violent, painful one, like that of the merciless slave.  
Jesus not only teaches these expectations with pronouncements and parables in Matthew, but 
he also exemplifies them with his own actions on Earth. Throughout Matthew, Jesus repeatedly 
faces violence, persecution, and the opportunity to react violently. However, he follows his own 
teachings and does not retaliate, “[b]ut his inactivity is full of meaning” (Davies and Allison 3:517). 
For example, when Judas betrays Jesus and he is arrested, Jesus does not fight back, instead he 
surrenders completely; therefore, his actions “harmonize with his decision in Gethsemane and his 
earlier moral instruction” (Davies and Allison 3:506). In fact, Matthew explains that Judas came to 
betray Jesus with “a great crowd with swords and clubs” (Matthew 26:47), as if he is expecting 
Jesus to put up a fight, but “[the] irony is plain: weapons are superfluous, for Jesus, faithful to his 
word, eschews physical violence” (Davies and Allison 3:507). Of course, Jesus responds with 
complete submission, saying, “Friend, do what you came to do” (Matthew 26:50) and, later, “Have 
you come out as a against a robber, with swords and clubs to capture me? Day after day I sat in the 
temple teaching, and you did not seize me” (Matthew 26:55). Jesus clearly wishes to highlight his 
non-violence during his arrest by verbally bringing attention to it. In fact, “Matthew has replaced 
the ‘I was with you’ of [Mark] 14:49 with the more vivid ‘I sat’…[perhaps to emphasize] Jesus’s 
passivity and lack of movement” (Davies and Allison 3:515). The crowds evidently came prepared 
for a violent interaction, as if they were seizing a violent criminal, but Jesus reminds them that they 
could have simply seized him when he was sitting in the temple teaching, as he would have reacted 
in the same way: peaceably.  
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Jesus again emphasizes his view of non-retaliation when one of the men who are with Jesus 
during his arrest reacts violently by cutting off the ear of the servant of the high priest, scolding the 
man: “Put your sword back into its place. For all who take the sword will perish by the sword” 
(Matthew 26:52). Here, Jesus clearly reiterates his prior teachings on non-retaliation and his 
disapproval of meeting violence with violence, stating, “‘Do you think that I cannot appeal to my 
Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?’” (Matthew 26:53). It is 
important to note the strength of resistance that Jesus has at his disposal, as “[a]ngels…are 
sometimes warriors in the biblical tradition, where they can fight with or on behalf of the saints 
[and] often they have swords” (Davies and Allison 3:513). This highlights Jesus’s submissiveness, 
by “mak[ing] it clear that it is not that he cannot resist but that he will not” (France 1008). In 
addition, Jesus’s statement emphasizes that “[p]hysical resistance was not only wrong in principle 
but also unnecessary, since [he] had far more force at his disposal, if he chose to summon it, than a 
few human supporters could offer,” suggesting that “[if] there is to be fighting, it is to be done by 
supernatural forces, not by human volunteers” (France 1014). Jesus exemplifies nonviolence and 
nonresistance, but he makes sure to clarify that his actions are not a sign of weakness or submission 
to his enemies, but a sign of submission to God’s will, in spite of his ability to resist through 
supernatural forces.  
Jesus also exemplifies nonresistance when he is abused by his arrestors “in a suitably cruder 
and more violent way” (France 1061); however, “[a]fter the brutal torture of the Roman flogging 
Jesus would [have been] in no state to resist even if he had wished” (France 1061), and in fact, 
“[k]nowing it was custom to carry one’s crossbeam…one [can infer] from this transitional verse 
that the scourging left Jesus so weakened that another had to be coerced to carry his cross” (Davies 
and Allison 3:610). Regardless, Jesus does not make even any feeble attempts to retaliate, despite 
	   	   Koch 13 
being beaten and mocked by his arrestors, who place a crown of thorns on his head, which “would 
inevitably be painful…even if the intention was primarily mockery rather than physical torture” 
(France 1062). Jesus makes no attempts to stop this mockery and physical torture, even if only by 
simply pushing the crown of thorns from his head, thus making him a perfect example of how to 
apply his teachings. 
The emphasis on Jesus’s passivity during his arrest and subsequent abuse implies that Jesus 
expects his followers to practice this type of passivity in their own lives, especially when faced with 
persecution. Again, France states that this type of violent reaction to “those who have spoken out 
for God” is to be expected (France 173), especially during Matthew’s time, when early Christians 
were persecuted heavily by Roman occupying forces (France 225). Jesus’s teachings stress that 
“physical violence, and particularly retaliatory violence, is incompatible with following [him]” 
(France 1013), though this does not necessarily imply that a good follower will live a completely 
peaceful life. Jesus’s teachings on non-retaliation do however imply that there is a “tendency of 
violence to recoil on those who perpetrate it” (France 1013). In this particular moment, Jesus 
strongly exemplifies the proper way to react to evildoers who commit violent acts against you; by 
giving in, and even chastising one of his followers for acting violently, Jesus fully submits to the 
will of his enemies, and shows his followers how to be “perfect, as [their] heavenly Father is 
perfect” (Matthew 5:48). In addition, Jesus demonstrates that one should not simply submit to the 
violence of one’s enemies because one should not react violently, but that one should submit 
because one is fulfilling the will of God, as Jesus does when he is arrested. The purpose of Jesus’s 
nonresistance to his arrest and subsequent crucifixion is to fulfill the will of God, for “[if] he had 
saved himself, he would not have been able to save others” (France 1070), and therefore, his 
followers should submit themselves and their lives to the will of God to save others as well.  
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While following God’s will may ultimately require martyrdom, as it did for Jesus, this does 
not mean that the wicked will prevail. Davies and Allison argue, “Although God may not nip evil in 
the bud, ultimately good will out” (Davies and Allison 2:210). Jesus’s followers cannot seek 
vengeance themselves, but Jesus promises that evildoers will meet their fate of violent punishment 
in the eschatological period, which seems at odds with Jesus’s pacifism on Earth. This apparent 
contradiction can be explained through an examination of the differences of earthly beings, like 
humans, and supernatural beings, like God. While humans, including Jesus, are expected to avoid 
vengeance or any form of retribution, even through legal proceedings, God makes no such promise. 
In fact, Jesus promises vengeance in the eschatological period, explaining the eschatological 
expectation of vengeance in many of his teachings, including the Parable of the Hidden Talents 
(Matthew 25:14-30). This parable seeks to teach followers to actively use what they are given to do 
good works – such as making peace or giving to the poor. However, Jesus also emphasizes in this 
parable that those who fail to do good works “condemn themselves to eschatological darkness” 
(Davies and Allison 3:402). Additionally, while Jesus teaches that his human followers should 
overcome their natural desire for lex talionis, Davies and Allison emphasize that there is “…no 
genuine contradiction between the rejection of lex talionis and a belief that eschatological 
punishment will fit the crime” (Davies and Allison 1:540), implying that Jesus teaches that a 
supernatural being – in this case God – can and will get vengeance for evil, but that is not up to 
humans to do so. This leads readers to the concept of a vengeful, eschatological Jesus – one very 
much in conflict with his pacifistic, earthly presence. 
The Expectations of the Vengeful, Eschatological Jesus 
Jesus teaches his followers that sinners will be punished, and those who commit violent acts 
will be met with violence when it comes time for the final judgment, thus forming the vengeful, 
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eschatological view of Jesus. In fact, Jesus says to his disciples, “Do not think that I have come to 
bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword” (Matthew 10:34). In this 
statement, Jesus becomes a symbol of violence and division, quite the opposite of the non-
retaliatory, pacifist ideal Jesus elsewhere emphasizes. Though the contradiction may be resolved 
with reference to Matthew’s occasional understanding of Jesus as a quasi-divine eschatological 
figure, the motif of a sword as a symbol for violence is prevalent in Matthew and in that literary 
context, Jesus’s use of it is somewhat ironic. For example, Jesus states at his arrest “for all who take 
the sword will perish by the sword” (Matthew 26:52). This means that although Jesus teaches 
submission to violence, he also teaches that those who perpetrate violence will not go unpunished, 
because they too will face violence and “perish by the sword” at the time of the final judgment. This 
is ironically demonstrated through Jesus himself, as he comes as the sword to divide people 
(Matthew 10:34), and then himself “perish[es] by the sword” (Matthew 26:52) when he is violently 
crucified.  
France offers a complementary approach to the “sword” of 10:34: “the ‘sword’ can hardly 
be understood literally,” and instead can be understood as “a metaphor for conflict and suffering” 
(France 408). Jesus metaphorically represents a sword because his actions divide people and create 
violence and suffering through his assertion of God’s message, which guarantees violent backlash 
and even in some cases death for his followers. In fact, Jesus’s “whole experience [is] the opposite 
of a ‘peaceful’ way of life…[as] the way to peace is not the way of avoidance of conflict” (France 
408). Therefore, while Jesus is not directly acting violently, he acts according to God’s will and 
teaches his followers to do the same, generating a violent response, and thus, albeit indirectly, 
causing violence as a sword would. Therefore, when Jesus is crucified, he faces violent punishment 
for bringing violence to the earth, and perishes by the very sword he brought. This is contrary to the 
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expectations of Jesus’s purpose on earth, as “peace [is] a basic human aspiration, [and] it was 
understood to be the purpose of the Messiah’s coming and the defining characteristic of God’s 
eschatological rule,” but this statement “is meant to shock” (France 408). According to Davies and 
Allison, “the main point is this: the time of Jesus and his church is not, despite the presence of the 
kingdom of God, the messianic era of peace” (Davies and Allison 2:218). 
 Jesus also emphasizes that those who follow him and act perfectly, as described previously, 
will be rewarded, but those that act violently or fail to do good deeds for others will face eternal 
punishment in Hell. For example, when he describes the final judgment, he states: 
When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him…he will separate 
people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats…Then the King 
will say to [his sheep], “Come, you who are blessed by my Father, inherit the 
kingdom”…[and] he will say to [the goats], “Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal 
fire prepared for the devil and his angels”…And these will go away into eternal punishment, 
but the righteous into eternal life. (Matthew 25:31-46) 
Here Jesus describes the final judgment in intense detail, and the punishment for sinners is an 
extremely violent one – burning in hell, as he commands the “goats” to “depart from [him]…into 
the eternal fire” (Matthew 25:41). The concept of “Hell” is repeated throughout the Gospel of 
Matthew, each time reminding the reader of the violent punishment that Jesus explains will occur 
there. For example, Jesus states that it is better to self-mutilate than to have one’s whole body 
thrown into Hell, suggesting extreme violence in Hell (France 206). According to France, Hell is 
“the place of final destruction of the wicked…[whose] name geëna derives from the Valley of 
Hinnom…outside Jerusalem which had once been the site of human sacrifice by fire to [the god] 
Molech” (France 202). It is important to note that “eternal” in this context could have two different 
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meanings: either “[eternal] punishment which relates to the age to come” or “[eternal] punishment 
which continues forever.” If one considers the metaphor of fire in Hell, according to France, this 
eternal fire “suggests destruction rather than punishment…[and not] ‘punishment which goes on 
forever’ but ‘punishment which has eternal consequences,’ the loss of eternal life through being 
destroyed by fire” (France 967). However, Davies and Allison argue that Matthew “seems to show 
agreement with those who believed the damned would suffer for ever…The wicked would be ever 
dying, never dead” (Davies and Allison 1:515). While either of these interpretations is plausible, it 
is clear that either way, Jesus’s conception of punishment in Hell is one of gruesome and violent 
suffering. 
Jesus further illustrates the type of punishment he envisions in Hell with a parable that he 
tells the chief priests and the scribes in the temple about the master of a vineyard and his tenants. 
The master rents his vineyard to tenants and leaves for another country, but when he sends three 
servants to collect his fruit, the tenants react violently and beat, kill, and stone each his servants. 
The master then sends a second, larger group of servants, which the tenants also treat violently. 
Then, the ever-forgiving master sends his son, expecting the tenants to respect his son, but they do 
not. Instead, they kill his son in hopes of collecting his inheritance. Jesus then asks the chief priests 
and scribes, “When therefore the owner of the vineyard comes, what will he do to those tenants?” 
(Matthew 21:33-40). Here, Jesus is clearly testing the chief priests and scribes, because while he 
preaches that his followers, or earthly beings, subscribe to a life of non-retaliation, he also 
emphasizes that God will seek vengeance for those who have sinned, as opposed to humans or the 
devil seeking vengeance. In fact, it is important to note that “there is no suggestion in biblical 
literature that the devil has the power of judgment, nor that God’s people should fear him…But a 
healthy ‘fear’ of God is a recurrent feature of [Old Testament] spirituality which the [New 
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Testament] in no way mitigates” (France 403). This suggests that God has the ultimate power and 
should be the only judge – one who is both revered and feared. The chief priests respond with these 
teachings in mind: “‘He will put those wretches to a miserable death and let out the vineyard to 
other tenants who will give him the fruits of their seasons” (Matthew 21:41). Finally, Jesus replies, 
“Therefore I tell you, the kingdom of God will be taken away from you and given to a people 
producing its fruits” (Matthew 21:43). In this moment, Jesus again deploys the language of ultimate 
judgment to imply that a disciple could be sent to hell for both violence and uselessness to the 
kingdom of heaven (France 957).  
Of course, the master in this parable is a symbol for the eschatological Jesus, or God, when 
he returns for the final judgment, the discourse on which this parable serves to tie up with “its 
portrayal of the Son of Man as the universal judge” (France 959). When the final judgment comes, 
God will sort the evil from the good – the “goats” from the “sheep” (Matthew 25:32). It is into these 
two groups that all people will be sorted, as Jesus’s teachings “[allow] for only two categories, the 
saved and the lost; there is no allowance for grades of good or evil” (France 966). The tenants who 
commit violent acts against the servants of God and God’s son, Jesus, are the evildoers or “goats,” 
and their punishment is “not merely eviction but ‘destruction,’ presumably referring to capital 
punishment for the murder they have committed…[a] punishment [that] fits the crime” (France 
814). In the parable “[t]he owner’s patience will obviously have been exhausted by the murder of 
his son, and he will act according to the lex talionis: murder calls forth murder” (Davies and Allison 
3:184), which illustrates this principle as it will apply to God’s eschatological judgment. 
Matthew even later clarifies that the chief priests and scribes know that Jesus is using the 
tenants as a metaphor for them (Matthew 21:45), and “having just themselves uttered what will 
happen to those who killed the householder’s son, they now invite the same fate by scheming to kill 
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the Son of God” (Davies and Allison 3:187). Through this parable, Jesus allows the chief priests 
and scribes to come to the realization that their punishment for the violence they commit against 
Jesus and other Christians will be a miserable death in the form of eternal punishment, or fiery 
destruction. Notably, each of the Synoptic gospels explains the fate of the servants in this particular 
parable differently: in Luke, the three servants are individually “ill treated but none [are] killed” 
(France 812), whereas in Mark, only one of the three servants is killed and the others are beaten. 
However, in Matthew, one servant is beat up, another is killed, and the final is stoned, which “gives 
the order of the verbs – beat, kill, stone – ‘a climax, in which the third step is an atrocious species of 
the second’ (Bengel, ad loc.): stoning was a brutal and (especially in the Jewish and Greek worlds) 
shameful death” (Davies and Allison 3:182). This again emphasizes Matthew’s focus on violence, 
especially as compared to Luke’s treatment of this parable, which is inherently less violent.  
This almost eager focus on violence during the eschatological period is a clear contradiction 
of the teachings of Jesus as an earthly being, which emphasize pacifism and non-retaliation. 
However, the differences in Jesus’s expectations for his followers and in how his role will take 
shape in the final judgment speak to the interactions between supreme beings, like God and the 
resurrected Jesus, and inferior beings, like humans – sinners and peacemakers alike. Only supreme 
beings are allowed to exact punishments on inferior beings without consequences. There is evidence 
that inferior beings cannot punish or harm each other by seeking vengeance, without facing violence 
from a supreme being, as previously mentioned in the discussion about the final judgment and its 
eternal and violent destruction of evildoers. However, if only God can punish evildoers without fear 
of violent consequence, Christian individuals and institutions influenced by Jesus’s teachings face 
an interesting challenge: how can humans prevent violence if they cannot retaliate, punish, or even 
seek non-violent legal redress? The following two sections seek to explain how these ideas have 
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interacted with or been outright ignored by human-organized legal systems in both medieval 
England and the modern United States. 
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Examining Medieval Legal Systems through the 
Lens of the Gospel of Matthew 
Introduction 
As Christianity spread, Jesus’s teachings began to impact moral codes throughout all of 
Europe. When the Christian faith was adopted by the Roman Empire, those morals had a much 
larger reach than ever before. Furthermore, the Middle Ages brought the rise of strong monarchies 
throughout much of Europe, and although these monarchies were sometimes in conflict with the 
Church and the Pope, they often emphasized a moral code that was based in Christian teachings. 
Because of this, much of how medieval legal systems dealt with issues of violence, crime, and 
punishment had a basis, whether formal or informal, in Christianity.  
For the purposes of this argument, I will examine the medieval English legal system – 
including both the ecclesiastical and secular courts – through the lens of Jesus’s teachings on 
violence, judgment, and punishment in the Gospel of Matthew, which is foundational to Christian 
ethical and legal reasoning. Through the examination of a series of reforms throughout the medieval 
period, it is apparent that the religious and secular leaders were trying to implement a legal system 
that reflected Jesus’s teachings, even though those teachings did not fully legitimize such a system. 
My analysis will have interesting implications for further consideration of our modern American 
legal system, as the English legal system gave birth to the common law tradition, which in turn was 
the foundation of the United States’ legal system. Thus, an examination of the modern legal system 
also shows the struggle of modern jurists to operate within the constraints of Jesus’s expectations 
and what is realistically feasible for humankind. 
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The Role of the Church in Medieval Law 
During the medieval period in England, there was not a true separation of church and state, 
as there is in the modern United States. The Church was involved in everyday affairs, including 
even the affairs of the government and the monarchy. During the eleventh century, the Archbishop 
of Canterbury would sometimes choose the new king with the help of “a group of lay and 
ecclesiastical people” and would preside at the coronation (Jason 340). It was clear during the early 
eleventh century in England that the Church and the royal government were entangled. Even in the 
English legal system during this period, there were two types of courts: the ecclesiastical and the 
royal courts. The ecclesiastical courts were under the control of the Pope in Rome, who had the 
“supreme power…[and] was the supreme legislator, administrator, and judge” (Jason 345), while 
the royal courts were subject to the King’s rule.  
During this time, the two systems “initially…maintained good relations…[but this] accord 
soon dissolved…resulting in a major conflict between church and state,” whose main point of 
contention was jurisdiction (Jason 341). At first, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was 
unlimited and included many types of legal proceedings (Jason 351), including “matters of 
ecclesiastical economy; church property; ecclesiastical dues and tithes; marriage; divorce; 
legitimation; testate and intestate successions of personal property; contracts involving pledge of 
faith or oath; various crimes and torts” (Sherman 246). Of course, the broadness of the final 
category, namely “various crimes and torts,” leaves room for interpretation as to what types of 
crimes or torts belonged in the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, but - as Peter D. Jason, a law 
professor at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, suggests – any “matters of morals” (Jason 351), 
including both criminal and civil offenses, could be tried in ecclesiastical courts Therefore, “[t]he 
jurisdiction of the church courts was not distinguishable from that of the King’s Courts” (Jason 
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351).  When claims of jurisdiction were made by both the ecclesiastical and the secular courts, the 
King’s courts would issue a writ of prohibition, which was “primarily an instrument to prevent the 
ecclesiastical courts from exceeding their jurisdiction…[and the writ] prohibited…continuing the 
litigation in the church court” (Jason 352). However, the populace seemed to prefer church courts 
“because they settled matters quickly and at less cost [than the royal courts]” (Jason 352). This 
points to the struggle for jurisdiction and legal power during the early and mid eleventh century, but 
it is important to note that the “two systems cooperated” and that jurisdictional disputes mainly 
arose due to “the insistence of the individual litigants rather than…an official act of the Church or 
King” (Jason 353-354). 
Despite the initial entanglement and cooperation of the Church and state, beginning under 
King William I in 1072, the legal system of England began to transition into a system in which 
“God’s business was to be separated from Caesar’s, with the appropriate renders being made in 
different courts” (Jason 341). King William I initiated a writ “[t]o increase the power of the 
monarchy…[by trying] to limit clerical independence…[while] the ecclesiastical courts were 
attempting to increase their own jurisdiction” (Jason 341-342). This culminated with the actions of 
King Henry II. Following his coronation in 1154, King Henry II attempted  
to assert his own position of power by decreasing the power of the English bishops in whom 
the Pope’s authority was vested…[and] arranged for his friend and chancellor, Thomas 
Becket, to be appointed Archbishop of Canterbury. Becket, however, displayed little loyalty 
to the King after he was appointed. Further, Becket insisted on the enforcement of certain 
prerogatives of the church and clergy that had previously been ignored. In retaliation, Henry 
published the Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164…The King’s public action forced the 
Pope to take an official stance; consequently the Pope condemned ten of the [sixteen] 
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Constitutions, four of which concerned the jurisdiction of church courts. The ensuing 
struggle had no winner. Becket was murdered and Henry was forced to repent and submit to 
the authority of the Pope. As a result, church courts, with the right of appeal to Rome, 
became firmly established in England. (Jason 343)  
Additionally, “[g]iven that the King was ‘a Christian and hence a subject of the pope one would 
have thought that the pope…would only have to admonish an English king that unless he yielded to 
the Holy Church’s jurisdictional demands he would be damned in hell” (Jason 344). However, 
while the courts were firmly established, “the Church lacked the power to enforce its decrees” 
(Jason 344). This meant that the King and the royal courts were able to maintain their power and 
control to some degree; thus the legal system remained ecclesiastically and secularly intertwined. 
Canon Law 
Because of this power struggle over jurisdiction, the courts, both secular and ecclesiastical, 
had several connections in terms of their laws and procedures. One such connection was that of 
canon law, which “stood at the crossroads of religion and justice” (Carruthers):  
The birth of canon law was…an attempt to codify the Church’s rules going back to the 
earliest ecumenical councils, in order to make it clear in what areas of social and religious 
life the church considered its authority to be independent of that of kings, and furthermore, 
to define what was binding on Christians in the Church’s own terms. (Carruthers) 
In canon law, the Church created its own legal system. However, while “[t]he origins of canon law 
go hand in hand with the development of ecclesiastical institutions…civil and religious 
laws…gradually became intertwined…and it was only from the mid-twelfth century onwards that 
the need arose to clarify the distinction between civil and religious law” (Carruthers). This shows 
that before the twelfth century, there was no need to distinguish between the two systems, either in 
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jurisdiction or in law. Therefore, many of the practices and customs, such as canon law, were 
intertwined and survived in both systems after their separation in the twelfth century.  
 As the ecclesiastical and secular courts began to separate and distinguish themselves, 
battling for jurisdiction, it became clear that they each needed codified laws. However, while 
England already had codified secular laws, they were never entirely separate from canon laws. “The 
first Anglo-Saxon law code was issued by England’s first Christian monarch Æthelberht, King of 
Kent (c. 580-616)” (Carruthers), which predates the struggle for power between the Church and the 
monarchy, and therefore the conception of canon law as distinct from secular law. Once the two 
systems began to separate by the mid-twelfth century, Gratian, “[who] appears to have been a monk 
and a papal lawyer…[and] who became known as the ‘father’ of canon law” codified canon law in 
his influential book called the Concordia Discordantium Canonum, or the Decretum, as it came to 
be known (Carruthers). The Decretum was important in the legal field, and spread across medieval 
Europe, “where it became the basic text for law students…[and] remained in force all through the 
later Middle Ages and well into the modern period, down to the Roman reform of canon law in 
1917” (Carruthers). Thus, even though the ecclesiastical and secular courts began to separate, 
because law students still studied Gratian’s codified canon law, the Church’s law remained 
entangled in the secular courts. 
Clearly, canon law, despite being to some extent separated from the secular legal system of 
medieval England, was an important influence on the legal systems during the medieval period. 
While it has been “argued [whether] both lay and ecclesiastical courts believed that the Canon Law 
was persuasive, but not binding” or whether they believed it was wholly binding (Jason 353), it is 
clear that it was highly influential throughout the legal field during this period, even if its laws were 
only viewed as persuasive precedents.  
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In fact, in the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus seems to sanction the creation of an ecclesiastical 
legal system, and he allows for excommunication if a defendant does not attempt to right his wrongs 
after several warnings from both private and public sources, including Church members (Matthew 
18:15-18). In this passage of Matthew, Jesus promotes a form of justice by stating that humans 
could punish a wrongdoer with excommunication if he did not right his wrongs. However, Jesus 
does not sanction any punishments imposed by humans other than excommunication, especially 
ones that are violent, and he only sanctions excommunication after multiple warnings. In this way, 
Jesus sanctions only justice systems that impose nonviolent punishments and seek to address 
wrongs within their local community, such as their Church.  
Because the ecclesiastical legal system, and in part canon law, stemmed from the beliefs and 
teachings of the Church, which stemmed from the Bible and, more specifically, the Gospels, Jesus’s 
teachings had an impact on the ecclesiastical legal system of the Middle Ages.  Moreover, because 
the ecclesiastical system and canon law influenced the secular legal system due to their initial 
entanglement, Jesus’s teachings also indirectly influenced the secular legal system of that time 
(Sherman 95). However, while canon law promoted the expectations of the Church, which were 
based in part in Scripture, these did not always align with Jesus’s teachings in the Gospel of 
Matthew, as I will show in my discussion of judgment and punishment in medieval England. 
Indeed, the very fact that the Church created a legal system with its own laws that it could apply 
through human judicial proceedings and use to inflict violent punishment was in some ways 
contrary to Jesus’s teachings that punishment should ultimately be left to God. The Medieval 
Church and the ecclesiastical legal system were struggling to apply Jesus’s teachings in a practical 
sense to their present world, and they were not always successful in their applications. 
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The Feudal System, Violence, and Law 
In the ninth and tenth centuries in medieval Europe, the feudal system began to develop, 
bringing “violent customs [that] replaced the old order of public justice” (Bisson 6). The “Feudal 
Revolution,” as Bisson coined it, “pointed to a devolution of power…with kingdoms fracturing 
progressively into principalities, counties, then most critically – at the end of the tenth century – 
into castellanies” (Bisson 6). This culminated in “a novel and radically feudalized social order by 
1060” (Bisson 7) – around the time that Gratian codified and published the Decretum. Within this 
new social order, while “castle-generated violence” (Bisson 7) was prevalent, “there was, in some 
sense, public order in the tenth century” (Bisson 9). In fact, “Adso of Montier-en-Der [a 
Benedictine monk and abbot] deplored the emergence of ‘tyrants’ violating ‘rights and statutes of 
laws’ in Burgundy after the death of Richard the Justiciar (d. 921), evoking the absence of ‘king’ or 
‘judge who wished in true justice to resist this wickedness of impious men’” (Bisson 10). This 
statement clearly provides evidence that there was a sense of justice and social order during this 
time, and that the violent actions of the feudal “tyrants” went against this order. In addition, the use 
of the word “impious” implies that the violence of the feudal “tyrants” went against a social order 
presumed to be based in religious beliefs or religious morality, like the morality taught by Jesus in 
the Gospel of Matthew.  
Within the feudal social order, it became common “to subjugate by…violence,” but this 
practice was most commonly used by powerful lords who owned castles, as castles allowed a sense 
of fortification against intruders or rebellious peasants (Bisson 16). In fact, “[t]he unfortified 
dominations exercised by rich peasants or horsemen fell into dependence on castles or disappeared” 
(Bisson 16), proving that one could only maintain control and power through the use of castle-
generated violence during this time. In addition, the Oath of Beauvais, taken by knights, provided a 
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path for a knight to act “as policeman, warrior and lord,” thereby giving him significant societal 
power. It allowed knights to act violently in certain situations, as outlined by Thomas N. Bisson, a 
medieval history professor at Harvard University: 
For example, the knight promises not to break into sanctuaries “on excuse of protection, 
unless on account of some malefactor who has broken this peace or on account of a 
homicide or…of the seizure of a man or horse…[a knight] shall not forcibly burn or destroy 
houses unless [he finds] an enemy horseman or robber inside and unless they should be 
joined to a castle or serve as a castle…[a knight] shall not destroy a mill or seize the grain in 
it, unless [he] should be in a cavalcade or an army [hostis] and unless it should be in [his] 
land.” (Bisson 20) 
Each of these oaths provides an exception in which the knight is allowed to act violently, especially 
if there is an enemy threat. While these oaths allow for some violence unlike Jesus’s teachings, they 
also set limitations on that violence, perhaps in an attempt to bring it somewhat in line with Jesus’ 
ethical teaching. In addition, by not retaliating or violently punishing the knights for their violence, 
the legal systems did, in fact, respond appropriately according to Jesus’s teachings. However, Jesus 
makes only makes exceptions for violence when supernatural beings perpetrate it, and therefore 
Jesus would not allow these exceptions for the violence of knights in the feudal system. This castle-
dominated feudal social order was the root of the modern Castle Doctrine, which I will discuss in 
the final section of my argument on modern law. Castle Doctrine serves as an example of how we 
have in some ways added more exceptions for violence, thus further separating modern laws from 
Jesus’s teachings. 
Despite the new and violent social order of the feudal system, “expressly legal proceedings 
persisted in the tenth century…. [T]he courts offered remedies to all on the basis of prescriptive 
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authority expressive of God-ordained regalian power” (Bisson 11-12). During this time, the legal 
system prevailed, but as discussed previously, the ecclesiastical and secular courts were intertwined, 
and the courts were believed to have power due to God’s sanction – whether through the divine 
right of the King or the Pope. However, the power of public authorities like the King and the Pope 
was challenged by the power of local lords. This power came through violence, which was “normal 
in the feud, a system of customary vengeance rooted in kin right, [and] which public authorities 
could only hope to channel, hope to limit the dangers it held for the innocent” (Bisson 13). Violence 
was not heavily contested by judicial authorities, and remained a regulated means of feudal tyrants’ 
advantage over and revenge against their enemies.  
This type of legal system that permits violence is not sanctioned in Jesus’s teachings, as 
Jesus repeatedly taught that any violence would subvert God’s will, and therefore, that his followers 
should submit to God’s will by not seeking vengeance or retribution, even if their enemies acted 
violently. Instead, according to Jesus, one should pray for one’s enemies and seek to make peace. 
While the violence of this period was certainly not promoted by the legal systems, the violence did 
operate within the “regalian legal order” (Bisson 14), therefore implying it was permitted by both 
secular and ecclesiastical courts. Jesus would certainly not have sanctioned such violent acts, but his 
teachings arguably imply that the legal systems attempting to develop his teachings into practical 
social guidance respond appropriately by turning the other cheek and allowing the violence to 
continue, instead of responding with retaliatory or retributive violence. This may show that within 
their struggle to apply Jesus’s teachings practically, the legal systems actually got it right in this 
context. They allowed the violence to continue, while trying to regulate it and limit its effects on the 
innocent, rather than using more violence to counter it. Notably, even churches and religious 
institutions relied on castle-generated violence and “lay lords for protection…[because] in this age 
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they had no choice. [It was better] to harness violence at a price than to give it free rein” (Bisson 
17). This is yet another example of how medieval jurists struggled within their social order to create 
a legal system that effectively dealt with this violence while also following Jesus’s teachings in 
Matthew. By not fighting the violence with more violence and instead harnessing it in an attempt to 
protect innocent lives, they were mostly able to follow Jesus’s teachings.	  
While the medieval legal systems’ struggle to deal with this violence arguably shows their 
attempts to follow Jesus’s teachings, the feudal lords’ violence shows that they made little effort to 
stick to their oath. Those in power were legally allowed to use violence to maintain their control and 
oppress others. In fact, during the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, scribes began “to change 
their vocabulary of power: the term miles in the unclassical sense of ‘horseman’ was introduced, 
together with an adjusted sense of caballarius; while dominus, hitherto reserved for God, kings and 
bishops, and lately applied to counts, was henceforth descriptive of masters of castles” (Bisson 22). 
Perhaps it was the usage of dominus as a word for masters of castles that led to a justification of the 
castle-generated violence – by connecting masters of castles to the connotation of ultimate and even 
godly power of the word “dominus.” The violent control of “exploitative lordship” was further 
supported ideologically by Christian beliefs: “Had not the Apostle himself admonished servants 
(servi) to submit to lords in all fear, ‘and not only to the good and gentle but also to the wicked ones 
[1 Pet. 2:18]’?” (Bisson 31-32). It is through the same moral principles outlined in Jesus’s teachings 
that the lords and knights justified their violent and oppressive behavior, which was not the 
intention of those teachings. While it is true that Jesus expects servants, and all of his followers, to 
face the persecution of their masters and not retaliate because that would fulfill the will of their 
ultimate master, God, the knights and lords that act violently act against Jesus’s expectations. 
Therefore, this implies that the knights and lords would eventually face God’s judgment and 
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punishment for their violence, according to Jesus’s teachings in the Gospel of Matthew, while the 
servants would be rewarded for meeting Jesus’s expectations of their submission to persecution and 
violence. Again, this demonstrates the struggle of human beings to practically apply Jesus’s high 
expectations. 
Even within the justice systems – both ecclesiastical and secular – the lords and their knights 
maintained power. Bisson states, “Although some in England suspected Normans, Bretons and 
Flemings were responsible, there was nothing specifically French about such oppressive behavior. 
Everywhere in the medieval West men appointed to guard castles, collect customary revenues and 
keep local order behaved…as aggressive lords replicating the predatory methods of the early 
castellans” (Bisson 36). This demonstrates that while feudal power was more prevalent in medieval 
France – mainly because the English king was better able to control most of the power – the English 
government did face the threat of feudal violence, and even feudal judicial interference. For 
example, “in the middle ages, judges and juries faced both physical and financial incentives to cater 
to the preferences of local feudal lords” (Glaeser and Shleifer 1195). Obviously, as this created a 
system in which violence equated to power, the lords held power even in the legal system. 
However, because feudal lords in England were less powerful than the king, and therefore, “more 
afraid of the king than of their neighbors…they were willing to pay the king to allow them to 
resolve disputes locally” (Glaeser and Shleifer 1196), which meant that feudal violence had less 
power over the legal system in medieval England than in other countries. This was critical in the 
formation of legal systems in the Middle Ages, and it created the division between civil and 
common law systems. In addition, the power of the King in England over the local lords enabled the 
legal system to better regulate their violence. 
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Analyzing Representations of Violence in Medieval Literature 
Despite the feudal reputation for violence and vengeance, it is clear that not all people in 
medieval England perpetrated violence, as “always the norm or appeal [of human social order] is to 
peace” (Bisson 10). In fact, the social order at the time, while being dominated by feudal violence, 
continued to seek peace and righteousness, as evidenced by anecdotes and literature.  For example, 
this is demonstrated by a story, “the Miracles of Saint-Maximin of Trier,” written in 964, in which 
the victims of feudal violence act as Jesus teaches they should in the Gospel of Matthew. In the 
story, after a “‘rich and noble’ man named Bernacher…unjustly usurped for himself little fields of 
the poor men” through violence, the victims of his oppression and persecution prayed to God and 
St. Maximin that Bernacher “‘…make do with what he had and not despoil them wickedly of their 
tiny possessions.’” However, Bernacher would not settle for his riches, and the “peasants called on 
their saint, who obliged with a suitably terrifying prodigy that brought their master to his senses and 
ended his persecution” (Bisson 14-15).  
In this story, Bernacher clearly represents the feudal lords, who used violence to fulfill their 
greedy desires and maintain control over their land and their servants. The peasants are persecuted 
and oppressed through this violence, much like the servants during the feudal period. However, 
instead of reacting violently with a revolt or an uprising, the peasants in the story “pray for [he] who 
persecute[s [them]” (Matthew 5:44) as Jesus teaches his followers to do, by praying to God and a 
saint, who in turn threatens Bernacher with a “terrifying prodigy.” This story follows Jesus’s 
teachings in Matthew closely, as it even leaves the judgment of the “evildoer” to a supernatural 
force. In addition, the saint does not condemn the greedy lord to a violent punishment, instead 
encouraging him to correct his wrongs, albeit rather threateningly. While this is only a story, it 
reflects the social revolution that occurred during this time, and how violence came to define power. 
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However, despite the violence of the medieval feudal period, there was an emphasis in society and 
in literature – as with the aforementioned political appeals to peace within the social order and this 
story – on the peaceful and nonviolent responses to enemies that corresponded with Jesus’s 
teachings. 
In addition, a fable – written by Jean de Marmoutier around 1180 – details an encounter 
between a count, Count Geoffrey of Anjou (1129-51), and a peasant, who does not recognize the 
count and tells him details of the oppression he faces at the hands of the local ministers. The peasant 
describes “how at harvest time the provosts ‘go out to the villages and, forcing the peasants to 
assemble, by a new law – or rather, violence – they impose a grain tax on them’” (Bisson 34). The 
provosts, or ministers, “demand from each as much as they can, dragging to court on false charges 
any who complain, from which the only escape is paying off the ‘wicked judges.’” The count, in an 
attempt to right the social wrongs that have occurred, rewards the “peasant-informer” and holds 
what “is virtually a trial” in which he judges the provosts and exacts their punishment (Bisson 34). 
Again, while this fable is a work of fiction, it has a strong basis in medieval history. According to 
Bisson, it “is no caricature…[and] is symptomatic, indeed informative, on three critical points: (1) 
the continuity of arbitrary lordship; (2) the identity of those who served lord-princes in their 
domains and the nature of their service; and (3) the nature of their accountability” (Bisson 35). It is 
also interesting to note that this fable parallels eschatological judgment, in that the patient and 
submissive peasant is rewarded, while the oppressive and wicked ministers are punished when the 
master comes to judge.  
However, there is another way to read this story. The judge in this instance is not God; 
instead, it is a human master that comes to judge other humans and impose punishment on them, 
which Jesus does not permit in his teachings in Matthew. It is through fables such as this one that 
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the connection between counts or earthly masters and God is both questioned and perhaps 
strengthened. Such tales can be used to justify human judgment, which Jesus specifically prohibits 
in the Gospel of Matthew. Regardless, it is clear that the literature of this time reflected the true 
nature of feudal lordship and the violence that many servants were forced to endure without 
retaliation on the pretense that they were serving both their earthly masters, the lords, and their 
heavenly master, God.  
Judgment and Punishment in Medieval England 
 Because there was an established – albeit ecclesiastically entangled – legal system in early 
medieval England, the government clearly believed that their social order should include judgment 
and punishment for those that violated social customs or laws. However, Egon Bittner and Anthony 
M. Platt argue, “If to commit a crime means to offend society [by violating social customs or laws] 
then it is not at all clear what the dues shall be that will expunge the offence and restore the violated 
order to its original state of integrity” (Bittner and Platt 81). In the limited abilities of humankind, 
“crime and punishment do not stand in a reciprocal relationship…Rather, they are, in a sense, 
analogous actions demonstrating that two wrongs can make a right” (Bittner and Platt 81). Of 
course, this is not what Jesus teaches – he expects his followers to right wrongs in a positive way, 
by doing good for those that wrong them and actively making peace. However, in addressing the 
issue of crime, especially violent crime, from a human perspective, Jesus’s teachings are not 
straightforwardly practical.  
It has been argued since the development of the earliest societies that there is a “larger 
interest” that the state is responsible for protecting through laws, judgment, and punishment, 
creating a “right to punish” for state authorities (Bittner and Platt 88). In addition, it was argued by 
Tudor theorists that crime was “an offense against God, a source of communal pollution which, 
	   	   Koch 35 
should the criminal be long unpunished, threatened to bring divine wrath down upon the entire 
commonweal” (Broude 48). In fact, it was the development of the medieval English legal system 
that “highlight[ed] the last step in the definition of the state’s right to punish…The 
concept…derived from the fact that an offence was an affront against the monarch carried over 
from the middle ages to absolute monarchy” (Bittner and Platt 88). Tudor theorists even argued:  
[While] God was understood to have reserved to Himself the punishment of those who 
offended him by transgressing…[only] in exceptional instances…was his direct intervention 
required; for run-of-the-mill cases, God was represented as content that mundane retribution 
be effected by the king and magistrates, whose offices had been ordained by God for that 
very purpose. (Broude 48). 
However, it is clear in the Gospel of Matthew that Jesus reserves judgment and punishment for God 
only, and he expects that any violent punishment should be imposed by supernatural – not human – 
forces, as human are expected to treat each other with love and kindness, not vengeance or 
retribution.  
The medieval English legal system, over time, not only moved further from Jesus’s 
teachings in its applications of punishment, but also in its more general view of the law. During the 
medieval period, a supporter of common law, Sir Edward Coke, argued “the law has ‘an 
independent existence of its own, set above the king as well as his subjects, and bound to judge 
impartially between them’” (Bittner and Platt 88). This implies that the law holds a position like that 
of God – able to see and judge and punish all, without any need for human involvement. It is not 
realistically feasible for human beings to implement a system that is as fair and impartial and 
omniscient as God, as any system developed by humans would inevitably rely on human judgment. 
Jesus does not permit this type of judgment in his teachings, and he does not trust humans to inflict 
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violent punishments on one another. Therefore, the systems that humans created could not replace 
God’s judgment and, because of this, they should not, according to Jesus’s teachings, punish 
wrongdoers with violence. 
 Often, especially during the medieval period, punishment was extremely violent. 
Punishment was typically very public, as “[l]egitimate, judicial violence was deemed essential in 
the fight to suppress illegitimate random violence…Mutilations sent out a message of warning and 
deterrence; executions offered the ultimate guarantee against repeat offenders” (McGlynn 54). In 
addition, it has been argued that there are two main justifications of punishment: the principle of 
retribution and the principle of deterrence. Often, retribution is associated with revenge, but “[i]ts 
conditions are not satisfied by giving vent to personal desires for vengeance…[instead] society has 
a moral right and duty to inflict punishment on offenders who consciously commit crimes” (Bittner 
and Platt 89-90). Kant argues: 
Judicial punishment can never be imposed merely for the purpose of securing some extrinsic 
good, either for the criminal himself or for civil society; it must in all cases be imposed (and 
can only be imposed) because the individual upon whom it is inflicted has committed an 
offence. (Bittner and Platt 90) 
Kant’s argument shows that retributive justice does not justify punishment for the sake of society 
when the victim of such punishment has not done anything to deserve it. Thus, the principle of 
retribution does not allow the punishment to exceed what would be just given a specific offence. In 
addition, retribution “suggests just or deserved punishment, often without personal motives” 
(Broude 38). Despite this, the principle of retribution does not follow Jesus’s teachings, as Jesus 
does not allow even retribution based on fairness; instead, Jesus prohibits retribution by human 
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forces entirely, especially in instances of violent punishment because, as mentioned previously, 
Jesus does not trust humans to implement their judgment fairly and impartially, as God does. 
On the other hand, the principle of deterrence seeks to prevent future crimes, while 
“provid[ing] the maximum of happiness for the greatest number of people” (Bittner and Platt 92). 
This implies that “all punishment is in itself evil…[and if] it ought at all to be admitted, it ought 
only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil” (Bittner and Platt 92). This 
belief is more closely aligned with Jesus’s teachings of actively making peace and his rejection of 
humans punishing other humans as wrong; therefore, its use would promote the expectations Jesus 
sets out for his followers.  
Canon Law and the Ordeal 
Though Jesus does not sanction human judgment and violent punishment in Matthew, 
because social customs and laws were often derived from Christian customs and canon law, the 
Church was, at least in the early medieval period, deeply involved in matters of judgment and 
punishment. For example, until 1215, priests were involved in a form of judgment known as the 
ordeal: trial by ordeal included trial by water, fire, or battle – each of which were extremely violent, 
and each of which were officiated by members of the clergy. The bishop supervised the ordeal, 
while a member of the clergy “blessed the elements used in it and gave communion to the proband,” 
in addition to uttering “priestly incantations” (McAuley 483). The ordeal was “designed to facilitate 
successful prosecutions in cases where there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence against the 
defendant” (McAuley 484), especially in response to the Roman tradition of requiring the testimony 
of two eyewitnesses, known as the adversarial principle (McAuley 475). Instead of relying on 
witness testimony, the ordeal, whether by water, fire, or battle, relied on “judicium Dei” or God’s 
judgment. If a defendant survived the ordeal, it was presumed that God judged him as innocent. For 
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example, in trial by water, a defendant’s legs were bound and he was thrown into water. If he 
floated, God had saved him, implying he was innocent. If he drowned, it was presumed that God 
had judged him as guilty and that his drowning was his punishment.  
However, this posed an issue for religious leaders, as it relied on an “unwarranted 
temptation of God” and “lacked a secure foundation in the Scriptural and legislative sources of 
Church law” (McAuley 474). Indeed, Jesus, when tempted by Satan to jump off the pinnacle of the 
temple, states, “Again it is written, ‘You shall not put the Lord your God to the test’” (Matthew 
4:7). This suggests that Jesus would not permit the use of God’s judgment in this instance, as it 
would constitute testing God, and the ordeal was clearly not how Jesus envisioned the final 
judgment in the Gospel of Matthew, or in any of the gospels for that matter. Therefore, while the 
ordeal claimed to rely on God’s judgment, it did so in a perverse way – a way in which Jesus clearly 
did not intend. Additionally, for those defendants who were not miraculously saved, the ordeal 
served as a violent and painful punishment that was brought on by humans, not God – a punishment 
that Jesus would not condone. However, the attempt to use God’s judgment shows that medieval 
jurists were trying, albeit failing, to apply Jesus’s teachings in a practical sense to their present 
world.  
 Because the ordeal did not have firm religious or scriptural sanction, Pope Innocent III 
banned priestly involvement in this process in 1215. This led the secular legal system to also 
abandon the ordeal, resulting in the complete abandonment of a violent “practice which had been an 
integral part of judicial procedure throughout Western Christendom for over three centuries” 
(McAuley 474). Ultimately, this created a need for new procedures to deal with crime and to 
enforce laws, which resulted in the use of human judgment, as opposed to Godly judgment, in the 
legal systems. Additionally, Pope Innocent III’s ban of clergy involvement in the ordeal and the 
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subsequent secular abandonment of the practice was a part a “procedural revolution…[that] was 
more than a drive for greater efficiency in the administration of criminal justice” (McAuley 476). 
This revolution “originated in the Dictatus Papae of Pope Gregory VII, which “[committed] the 
papacy to a programme of spiritual renewal of the clergy which included the systematic 
disentanglement of ecclesiastical and lay interests” (McAuley 476). The introduction of human 
judgment “marked the beginning of the end of the medieval jurists’ reliance on appeals to the 
supernatural as a means of solving hard cases” for both the secular and ecclesiastical courts 
(McAuley 497). 
 In all of Western Europe, with the exception of England, the abandonment of the ordeal led 
to the use of trial by inquisition. However, in England, God’s judgment in the ordeal was replaced 
with the judgment of one’s peers in a trial, initially “in criminal cases by a jury of presentment, the 
precursor of the trial jury” (McAuley 474). Of course, this transition to human judgment also did 
not align with Jesus’s expectations, though it was clearly less violent than the ordeal, therefore 
bringing the medieval English legal system a small step closer to Jesus’s expectations. However, 
even as the medieval English legal system transitioned from judiciam Dei to human judgment with 
the abandonment of the ordeal, this “criticism of the ordeal was neither a harbinger of secularization 
nor the symptom of a crisis of faith; it took place within the tradition of religious belief not in 
opposition to it” (McAuley 477). The use of the ordeal was criticized because “it was devoid of 
Scriptural sanction,” which was important to canon law practices, as they “rest on a foundation of 
Biblical authority” (McAuley 477-478). Even if one strictly looked at Jesus’s teachings in the 
Gospel of Matthew on violence and human judgment or punishment as the guiding foundation for 
canon law, it is abundantly clear that practices like the ordeal were without Jesus’s sanction.  
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Furthermore, while there is one passage in the Book of Numbers “which appeared to 
sanction recourse to the ordeal of bitter waters in cases of adultery by a wife…as both the Old and 
New Testaments were otherwise silent on the subject of ordeals, the slender authority provided by 
the Book of Numbers did not survive the rigorous dialectics of canonists” (McAuley 478). 
However, based on the custom of the ordeal and the loose support provided in the Book of 
Numbers, several canons were written in support of the ordeal. To deal with this issue, several 
canonists sought to “[compare and contrast] the problematic canons with the broad swathe of papal 
statues opposed to the ordeal,” many of which were based in Scripture. In fact, Gratian, in his 
Decretum, or as it was originally known, Concordia discordantium canonum – A harmony of 
conflicting canons – sought to “reconcile conflicts of authority as best he could, without doing 
undue violence to the sources” (McAuley 480). While there was some canonical support for the 
ordeal, it is clear that the ordeal went against a majority of the moral principles that eventually 
became canon law, and therefore, its abandonment by first the clergy and eventually the secular 
authorities was an effort to use more humane and scripturally sanctioned legal practices.  
While the medieval English legal system certainly was not entirely faithful to Jesus’s 
teachings in Matthew, the abandonment of the ordeal pushed the system towards a more faithful 
representation of those teachings, at least in terms of the use of human violence to punish others. 
While the abandonment of the ordeal also meant the abandonment of the use of God’s judgment, it 
showed the medieval legal systems’ struggle to practically, yet faithfully apply Jesus’s teachings to 
the real world through a series of reforms. It seems that with each reform, the legal system at least 
attempted to better meet Jesus’s expectations. In this case, the abandonment of the ordeal left 
behind the unsanctioned temptation of God and attempted to substitute human judgment and 
punishment, which resulted in a potentially less violent and more objective legal system.  
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The Transition to the Use of Human Judgment 
In the Ecclesiastical Courts 
Turning first to the ecclesiastical courts, one finds that there were several attempts to 
institute human judgment in their procedures to replace any reliance on the ordeal: first, the exceptio 
criminis, which “was a procedural device [that] parties to a lawsuit could use to disqualify the 
evidence of an opponent or hostile witness. In essence it was a claim that the person named in the 
exceptio had committed some specified crime and hence could not legally institute a lawsuit or 
testify in one” (McAuley 486). When a party used the exceptio crimins, there would follow a 
“hearing…[much like] a criminal trial to determine whether that person was guilty of the offence as 
charged,” which would take place in front of a judge. However, even if the person was found guilty 
through the hearing process, this “did not result in the infliction of punishment…its principal effect 
was to bar participation in the main action” (McAuley 486).  
Additionally, the ecclesiastical courts used a procedure called the denunciatio evangelica, 
which “had three steps: fraternal admonition, public rebuke, and, in the event that these proved 
inefficacious, the matter could then be taken up by the ecclesiastical courts” (McAuley 487). Each 
of these steps stems from Jesus’s teachings on forgiveness: “If your brother does something wrong, 
go and have it out with him alone, between your two selves…but if he refuses to listen…report 
it…to the community” (Matthew 18:15-17). Through this procedure, a judge would determine the 
guilt of the person named in the denunciatio, but this also did not often result in punishment, as the 
judge most commonly would “make an order directing the defendant to mend his ways in the 
future,” or alternatively, and more closely aligned with the idea of punishment, “order the 
person…to make amends to those he had injured or risk continuing excommunication” (McAuley 
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487). While the threat of excommunication was a serious threat equivalent to a punishment, it was 
not a violent punishment, like that of trial by ordeal, and the order to make amends or to behave 
better in the future is more closely aligned with Jesus’s teachings on active peacemaking. Therefore, 
the use of denunciatio evangelica better met Jesus’s expectations for dealing with defendants, as it 
attempted to both make peace and left ultimate judgment and punishment to God, as opposed to 
human beings. Additionally, Jesus teaches that as long as the person bringing the suit addresses the 
defendant privately first, the public denunciation or hearing was permissible.  
Finally, the ecclesiastical courts also used a procedure known as per notorium, in which the 
defendant would not have the opportunity to present a defense and the outcome of his case would 
entirely depend on how widely it was known that he committed a wrong. It was assumed that if it 
was widely believed that the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged, there was 
no need for evidence – the notoriety of his crime was enough to submit him directly to judgment 
and punishment. This type of criminal procedure represented “[a] striking example of the papal 
party’s determination to deal with the problem of concubinage…[as] this arrangement effectively 
neutralized all of the due process guarantees built into the traditional ordo iudiciarius [which 
outlined the rights of the defendant]; and was criticized on this account by the glossators as ‘very 
difficult and dangerous’” (McAuley 488). Of course, this procedure was far from Jesus’s teachings, 
as the judge “often had to determine the issue of guilt or innocence by a process of inferential 
reasoning form the facts as he determined them, thus placing human judgment at the centre of the 
judicial process” (McAuley 488). In addition, this type of procedure would require an omniscience 
that is reserved for only God, and exemplifies why Jesus prohibited human judgment in his 
teachings; he did not believe that humans were capable of being fair and impartial in their 
judgments of each other, and that is exceptionally apparent in this type of legal proceeding.   
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While my examination of Jesus’s teachings did not justify the use of human judgment, Pope 
Innocent III’s “appeal to the authority of the Scriptures…showed that both the Almighty and His 
messenger on earth had resorted to the processus per inquisitionem, and thus provided an 
authoritative basis for investing contemporary ecclesiastical judges with comparable powers when 
pursuing those widely suspected of wrongdoing” (McAuley 493). Of course, my analysis shows that 
this is not the case, though my analysis was limited to the Gospel of Matthew, and perhaps a more 
full analysis of the Bible and Jesus’s teachings in the other synoptic gospels would support the idea 
that the use of human judgment to implement violent punishment was acceptable in certain 
circumstances. However, in the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus does not allow humans to subject others 
to violent punishment based on their own judgment; thus, judges during the medieval period did not 
have “an authoritative basis” for using their own judgment and implementing violent punishments 
on others, as Pope Innocent III suggests. Jesus instead holds his followers to an extraordinarily high 
standard and asks them to leave vengeance to God, which R.T. France suggests is not even truly 
practical.  
The “reform package” of Pope Innocent III also included legislation called Sententiam 
sanguinis, which pushed the ecclesiastical system further away from Jesus’s teachings. Finbarr 
McAuley states: 
[The Sententiam Sanguinis] sought to outlaw clerical involvement in a range of activities 
connected with the shedding of blood…[and] was principally concerned with clerical 
involvement in the infliction of blood punishments, thereby reflecting the Church’s growing 
concern with the increasingly sanguinary nature of the criminal sanction in the secular courts 
(in which, lest it be forgotten, the judicial function was often discharged by clerics), in 
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contrast with its own attempts to fashion a penology of repentance and reform more in 
keeping with the spiritual mission of priesthood. (McAuley 501-502) 
This legislation was enacted to protect clergy members from “becom[ing] complicit in the mortal 
sin of homicide” (McAuley 504), but it allowed special privileges of protection for judges and 
soldiers when it came to homicide, which were also outlined in the law of homicide, therefore 
justifying some forms of capital punishment and creating a sense of “immun[ity] from the moral 
danger associated with joining in a collective killing” (McAuley 505). This immunity was granted 
to judges and soldiers alike by the Latin Fathers of Late Antiquity, and as canonists and theologians 
followed suit, it trickled down to Gratian, who also agreed that there are some homicides that are 
justified: namely, “killings done pursuant to the law or by soldiers when repelling an enemy 
attack…[or] a man [who] accidentally let a spear fly from his hand” (McAuley 505). However, it is 
clear that Jesus does not make these assumptions, and therefore, anyone complicit, whether directly 
or indirectly, in the killing of another is not “regarded as being free of the taint of homicide” 
(McAuley 505), and is liable to face God’s judgment and punishment in the eschatological period. It 
is also clear, though, that the medieval jurists were attempting to meet Jesus’s expectations, but they 
were struggling to apply his teachings practically. 
In the Secular Courts 
 The secular medieval English courts also instituted human judgment, creating a legal system 
that centered on human judges and juries that determined the guilt or innocence of a defendant 
under King Henry II in the twelfth century (Glaeser and Shleifer 1198). At its conception, “the jury 
was an assembled body of local notables who would inform itinerant royal judges of local 
facts…[and] was responsible for providing vere dicta (true statements) and not actually given 
control over the outcome of the case” (Glaeser and Shleifer 1198). However, as time went on, 
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“there was a gradual movement to ensure that judges could not convict without the consent of a 
jury…[because] King John agreed that he and his subjects were to be governed by rule of law and 
that ‘no person may be amerced (i.e., fined) without the judgment of his peers’” (Glaeser and 
Shleifer 1199). This created the foundation for the jury trial, as well as due process of law, and 
eventually “jury nullification, whereby juries systematically refused to convict suspects of crimes 
when the penalties were seen as excessive (such as a hanging for theft of value above one shilling)” 
(Glaeser and Shleifer 1199). This formed an evolving standard of decency within the secular courts, 
much like that of the reform of clerical practices at this time in the ecclesiastical courts. Both 
systems faced a movement toward human judgment, but the secular courts were less restricted in 
their use of human judgment, as they were not bound by canon law or scripture, therefore resulting 
in a legal system that more exclusively focused on law and order through human judgment and 
punishment. 
However, while the secular courts were not bound by scriptural sanction, like the 
ecclesiastical courts, much of canon law and religious doctrines influenced them, and therefore, 
their use of human judges and juries is also subject to scrutiny under the lens of Jesus’s teachings in 
Matthew. Even secular jurists faced the challenge of addressing Jesus’s prohibition of human 
judgment: “Having grown up with the idea that only God could fathom the truth in cases where 
direct testimony by witnesses was lacking, the argument is that the contemporary jurist was 
psychologically incapable of substituting human for Divine judgment” (McAuley 508). Therefore, 
the scriptural emphasis on supernatural judgment led to two manifestations that were significant in 
the development of medieval secular legal systems: “[f]irst, the city states passed legislation 
effectively prohibiting the use of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases…[and second] the civil 
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authorities opted for a rigid system of objective proofs in lieu of a process of inferential reasoning 
based on circumstantial evidence” (McAuley 508).  
The prohibition of the use of circumstantial evidence in the secular courts allowed them to 
circumvent the teachings of Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew, as they promoted the use of hard facts 
over human judgment. However, the secular legal systems, especially in medieval England still 
relied somewhat on human judgment, mostly in interpreting the hard facts and applying them to the 
softer rules of law. As Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer argue, “common law [that of 
medieval England]…[relied] on lay judges, broader legal principles, and oral arguments” (Glaeser 
and Shleifer 1193). It is in the application of the broader legal principles provided by common law 
and then interpreted by human judgment of the “lay judges,” in addition to the need for human 
judgment in interpreting oral arguments and human imposition of punishment that created a conflict 
between Jesus’s teachings on human judgment and punishment and the secular medieval English 
courts. This is the clearest departure from Jesus’s teachings, which paved the way for a more 
secularized system. Furthermore, the secular courts’ prohibition of circumstantial evidence 
contradicted the use of circumstantial evidence in the ecclesiastical courts “as an essential tool” in 
criminal proceedings (McAuley 509); thus, as the medieval period proceeded, the separation 
between the ecclesiastical and secular legal systems grew, which ultimately culminated in the 
development of two distinct legal systems: civil law and common law. 
The Common Law Tradition: Common Law versus Civil Law 
The medieval English legal system became the basis for a tradition of law known as 
common law, from which the laws of many countries were formed, including the United States. 
Until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the legal systems of France and England were fairly 
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similar and “governed primarily by religious and customary law” (Glaeser and Shleifer 1197). 
However, the division of the ecclesiastical and secular courts in England during this period led to 
the development of another system of law as well, known as civil law. Civil law was based in 
Roman Law, but “was lost during [the] Dark Ages…[and] rediscovered by the Catholic Church in 
the eleventh century,” thus closely tying it to ecclesiastical or canon law (Glaeser and Shleifer 
1193). Eventually, civil law was adopted by “several continental states, including France [and 
Spain]”, and it was “transplanted through conquest and colonization to Latin America and parts of 
Africa and Asia” (Glaeser and Shleifer 1193), while common law was spread throughout the 
English colonies, including Australia, Canada, and, most significantly, the United States. 
 The main differences between civil and common law are structural: “civil law relies on 
professional judges, legal codes, and written records, while common law [relies] on lay judges, 
broader legal principles, and oral arguments” (Glaeser and Shleifer 1193). These systems developed 
this difference due to the “different levels of control that the sovereign exercised over judges” 
(Glaeser and Shleifer 1194) during the medieval period, as the French monarchy had more trouble 
gaining power over feudal lords, and thus needed stronger control over their legal systems. They 
appointed professional judges that were bound by specific legal codes, so that feudal lords could not 
bully or coerce judges into serving their interests. The codification of “bright line” rules, or laws 
that make it simple to determine whether they have been broken, was characteristic of civil law 
systems. However, in England, the king had much more power over the nobles and feudal lords, and 
he therefore did not to exert his influence as strongly over the local judges. Common law systems 
used oral arguments and separate prosecutors and judges to determine their cases, and placed a 
heavier importance on precedent. Thus, common law was created to allow the judges and eventually 
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juries more power and independence from the monarchy in determining the outcome of a case 
(Glaeser and Shleifer 1194-1196). 
 Over time, “common law judges insisted that the principal source of English law was 
historical precedent rather than the will of the sovereign,” and by the end of the seventeenth 
century, royal control was entirely removed from the English legal system (Glaeser and Shleifer 
1200). The French monarchy, in contrast, “move[d] toward a judge-inquisitor model governed by 
Romano-Canon law” (Glaeser and Shleifer 1200) in the mid-thirteenth century, thus putting civil 
law more under the control of the Church. However, despite this difference, both systems used 
human judgment, which Jesus expressly forbids in the Gospel of Matthew. 
 The importance of the tradition of common law, and its reliance on precedent cannot be 
overlooked. Because the English legal system relied so heavily on precedent cases and because the 
system began as an ecclesiastically entangled system, common law brought religious precedents. As 
common law spread through English colonization, it embedded Christian morality in other legal 
systems through its use of religious precedents. Of course, one of these colonies was the United 
States of America, and while there has been a claim of a separation of church and state in the United 
States, its reliance on English common law suggests that there are elements of Christianity 
entangled within its legal system. In fact, even the United States Supreme Court “noted the close 
relation of church and state when it recognized that ‘the Christian religion is part of the common 
law…’” in 1844 (Garry 491). 
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Examining the Modern American Legal System  
through the Lens of the Gospel of Matthew 
Introduction 
 In this final section, I will examine how elements of Jesus’s teachings in the Gospel of 
Matthew on violence and non-retaliation – as well as on judgment and punishment – have persisted 
throughout history and survived into the modern American legal system. Because the tradition of 
common law was transplanted through English colonization of what is now the United States, many 
of the religious precedents in that tradition were transplanted in the colonies as well, and they 
eventually made their way into the American legal system. Despite the alleged separation of church 
and state, Christianity has had an influence on the American legal system’s treatment of these 
issues, and therefore, it is appropriate to examine this system through the lens of the Gospel of 
Matthew and to examine how this system’s laws fit into the mold created by Jesus’s teachings. The 
United States’ legal history, much like Medieval England’s legal history, reflects the struggle of 
how to deal with the issues of violent crime, judgment, and punishment while also dealing within 
the context of the moral code presented in Jesus’s teachings in Matthew.  
The Separation of Church and State 
 Though the United States Constitution includes in its first amendment what has come to be 
known as “the Establishment Clause,” this clause has been transformed into its modern context, and 
through this transformation, it has ignored the original intention of the Framers of the Constitution. 
In fact, the strict separation now commonly cited in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is not 
mentioned or even implied in the Establishment Clause or anywhere else in the Constitution: the 
“wall of separation” was merely “a figure of speech lifted from a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote 
years after the First Amendment was ratified” (Garry 497). When the Constitution was written in 
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the late eighteenth century, “religion was as publicly practiced as politics, with civil laws often 
reflecting religious values” (Garry 475). While many of the colonies were founded in America with 
religious freedom as their main goal, this certainly did not imply that these new colonies would be 
governed without religion. In fact, “the new Americans…were simply attempting to make the New 
World into a better image of God’s Kingdom. To them, the lesson of religious intolerance in Europe 
was not that church and state should be strictly separated, but that a corrupt government had in turn 
corrupted a state religion” (Garry 476). In fact, the colonists chose to break off from English control 
not because they wanted to build a “wall of separation” between religion and government, but 
because they felt that the English establishment of the Anglican Church encroached on a 
fundamental right to freedom of religion. This implies that the colonies, and subsequently the 
United States, were founded on the principles of religion, and thus, these principles could not truly 
be separated from their government.  The colonists sought to create a system that would not 
persecute anyone based on their religious choice and that would not show preference to one religion 
over another. In creating this system, the Framers, whether intentionally or not, followed Jesus’s 
teachings in Matthew – they accepted all religious beliefs, and created a system that would not 
allow violence toward others based on those beliefs.  
 The Framers’ decision to allow religious influence in their new government without 
showing preference to any one religion has had a significant impact on developments within the 
United States government and legal systems. For example, one can observe this through many 
practices in modern America: 
Witnesses in courts swear on the Bible and take an oath that concludes “So help me God.” 
Presidential proclamations invoke God. The Supreme Court opens its sessions with the 
invocation “God save the United States and this honorable Court,” and above the seat of the 
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Chief Justice hangs the Ten Commandments. In the House and Senate chambers appear the 
words “In God We Trust.” The Great Seal of the United States proclaims “Annuit Coeptis,” 
which means “He [God] has smiled on our undertaking,” and under the seal is inscribed the 
phrase from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, “This nation under God.” Engraved on the metal 
cap of the Washington Monument are the words “Praise be to God.” Both houses of 
Congress, as well as many state legislatures, precede their daily work with a prayer given by 
a public-funded legislative chaplain. The national currency carries the motto “In God We 
Trust,” and schoolchildren pledge allegiance to “one nation under God.” (Garry 493) 
The copious examples provided in this analysis prove that the Church and state are truly not 
separate in the United States, despite the suggestion of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
The influence of religious doctrine, of course, impacts how the American legal system treats the 
issues of violence, retaliation, judgment, and punishment. 
The Use of Violence in Self-Defense Under Modern American Law 
 Within the United States, there are hundreds of laws governing violence and violent crimes, 
as well as how citizens respond to violence and how offenders are tried and punished for violent 
crimes. Each of these laws is either codified or dealt with through legal precedents, and for the 
purposes of this argument, I will focus specifically on Federal and New York State laws on self-
defense, such as modern Castle Doctrine – a surviving doctrine from English common law – and so-
called “Stand Your Ground” laws, which are a modern adaptation and expansion of Castle Doctrine. 
It is through this examination that one can see the struggle of modern jurists to create a system 
which both follows Jesus’s moral instruction in Matthew and practically and justly deals with 
violent crime. 
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 The United States has attempted to deal with the issue of violence in cases of self-defense by 
allowing a defendant accused of violent crime to claim self-defense, in both state and federal courts. 
However, the legal system has significantly limited what it considers to be justified violence under 
self-defense law. This demonstrates modern jurists’ (perhaps unconscious) desire to cling to 
foundational principles Jesus’s teachings that prohibit human judgment and the implementation of 
violent punishment.  
According to FindLaw.com, “Self-defense is defined as the right to prevent suffering force 
or violence through the use of a sufficient level of counteracting force or violence” (“Self-Defense 
Law: Overview”). This definition leaves room for interpretation and significant questions, however, 
such as how much force is considered sufficient and how can one determine that the victim’s 
actions were truly intended to prevent the suffering of personal violence. To deal with these 
questions and limit the violence that is legally permissible, a self-defense claim must be validated 
by meeting specific conditions. First, the self-defense act must be in response to an “imminent 
threat” – this threat can be physical or verbal, as long as the verbal threat “puts the intended victim 
in an immediate fear of physical harm” (“Self-Defense Law: Overview”). In addition, within this 
requirement, the justification for self-defense disappears when the threat ends. For example, if 
someone punches someone else in the face, but promptly walks away, the threat has ended and any 
attempts by the initial victim to strike back would be considered retaliatory and would not be 
covered by self-defense laws. This requirement prevents the type of retaliatory justice that Jesus is 
so firmly against in his teachings, but it also allows a modern sense of protection against violence 
under the law that Jesus’s teachings do not make room for.  
 Furthermore, a self-defense claim requires that the victim uses the appropriate amount of 
force in response to an attack – “in other words, a person can only employ as much force as 
	   	   Koch 53 
required to remove the threat” (“Self-Defense Law: Overview”). This requirement sets up a 
proportionality principle in self-defense law, which prevents someone from responding to an attack 
with even more violence. For example, as in the previous example, if the attacker punched the 
victim, the victim cannot then kill the attacker, even if in immediate response to the threat. Finally, 
the original self-defense laws required victims to attempt to retreat and avoid the attack before 
responding violently. Proponents of this requirement “argue that it is the supreme value of life that 
demands flight of those who are unlawfully attacked” (Carpenter 656).  
Castle Doctrine 
 Castle Doctrine, which is derived from the medieval feudal system and its use of violence 
and castles as defense, is a modern legal doctrine that serves in the federal and state courts as an 
exception to the “duty to retreat” rule. Modern Castle Doctrine suggests, “Generally…those who are 
unlawfully attacked in their homes have no duty to retreat, because their homes offer them the 
safety and security that retreat is intended to provide” (Carpenter 656-657). Therefore, within one’s 
home, he is legally permitted to use lethal force, if necessary, in self-defense. This, like other self-
defense laws, poses significant legal and moral dilemmas, as it both protects the sanctity of life by 
allowing a victim to defend himself, but also forces the attacker to forfeit his own right to life. In 
addition, this has challenging consequences when self-defense is used within one’s home to defend 
against an attacker who also lives in that home, such as in domestic violence cases. In that case, 
both the attacker and the victim have the right to life and the right to safety and security in their 
home, making such cases legally complex. Castle Doctrine is a surviving vestige of the medieval 
feudal system and, though it represents an attempt to limit violence in that it only allows deadly 
violence in defense of self in one’s own home, it does not follow the morality expressed by Jesus’s 
teachings or historical jurisprudence on self-defense, both of which seek to protect life. Therefore, a 
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true follower of Jesus would not be able to defend himself, even in his home, as Castle Doctrine 
would suggest; instead, he would have to fall victim to martyrdom, which is one of the expectations 
outlined by Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew. 
Recently, twenty-five states have expanded Castle Doctrine and passed so-called “Stand 
Your Ground Laws,” which do not require a “duty to retreat” in many, if not all, circumstances. 
These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and 
West Virginia (“Self Defense and ‘Stand Your Ground’”). Florida was the first to pass such a law in 
2005 (Cheng and Hoekstra 821). However, New York State does not have any such law. Each of 
the states that allow a victim to “stand his ground” clearly violates Jesus’s teachings on how to 
respond to violence, thus suggesting a recent transition even further away from Jesus’s moral code 
in an attempt to justify self-defense and protect victims of violence. 
 A study on whether expansions to Castle Doctrine deter crime or simply escalate violence 
suggests, “[T] he prospect of facing additional self-defense does not deter crime...[and there is] in 
contrast…significant evidence that the laws lead to more homicide. Estimates indicate that the laws 
increase homicides by a statistically significant 8 percent” (Cheng and Hoekstra 823). Cheng and 
Hoekstra also establish that the misreporting of these justified self-defense killings are not likely to 
make up the entirety of the increase of 600 homicides per year in these states (Cheng and Hoekstra 
824), as “there would have to be at least some cases of multiple killed assailants by a would-be-
killed victim” (Cheng and Hoekstra 844). Furthermore, according to their statistical analysis, they 
found “that 90 percent of the time [there would be] deterrence effects of less than…0.5 percent 
for…aggravated assault” (Cheng and Hoekstra 832). While it would seem that a rational criminal 
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would be less likely to attack a victim in a state where the victim would then have the right to use 
lethal force against him, this study found that there was little deterrent effect. In addition, the lack of 
deterrent effect created by these laws, combined with the potential explanation that “a rational 
criminal may respond to a real or a perceived increase in the likelihood of encountering a victim 
willing to use lethal force by using a deadly weapon himself” could potentially explain the increase 
in homicides, but “while [the study finds] suggestive evidence of escalation by criminals, it is not 
conclusive” (Cheng and Hoekstra 845). The evidence brought forth by this study suggests that 
perhaps the United States’ recent legal expansions to Castle Doctrine should be reevaluated in order 
to meet the developing expressions in the legal field that condemn the use of retaliatory violence, 
even in self-defense. In fact, this study suggests that Jesus’s teachings on violence may even be a 
moral goal for the U.S. legal system, as the separation from his teachings has led to more violent 
homicides, and the net loss of life, while legally permissible, may not be morally permissible in 
modern public and legal opinion. 
On the “Right to Self-Defense” 
 In fact, there is some debate over whether there is a “right to self-defense” at all. Whitley 
Kaufman argues, “…it is not obvious from either the moral or legal standpoint why we should want 
to allow individuals to be making judgments about who they may kill on their own initiative” 
(Kaufman 20). Of course, Jesus’s teachings expressly forbid this type of individual judgment and 
retaliatory violence. Jesus’s full prohibition of this type of self-defense makes the issue much 
simpler than the modern legal system, which tangles the right to life of the victim and the attacker, 
as given in the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. If all people have the right to life and 
due process, this complicates the right to self-defense, especially in lethal incidents. For example, if 
an attacker attempts to kill a victim, and the victim in response uses his “right to self-defense” to 
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kill the attacker, while this is typically legally permissible under self-defense law, the victim’s use 
of lethal force “does not provide due process of law” and requires the forfeiture of the attacker’s 
right to life (Kaufman 23).  
However, this poses an additional problem; there is a “common belief that basic human 
rights are inalienable,” and therefore, they cannot be forfeited, no matter if the person is an enemy 
or an attacker. In fact, Kaufman argues that the use of lethal force in self-defense is not only a 
violation of the right to life, but also “a radical divergence from the common law tradition of self-
defense [and] morally intolerable” (Kaufman 27). This expression seems to be prevalent in modern 
society, with many supporters, such as Robert Schopp, a law professor, who argues in his 1994 
article that “allowing ‘severe violence’ to prevent ‘relatively minor transgressions’ is not only 
‘intuitively questionable,’ but also ‘conflicts with predominant law’” (Kaufman 28). Similarly, 
Stuart Green, another law professor, states in his 1999 article, “Human life is simply too precious a 
good [not] to be valued over even valuable and irreplaceable property, such as one’s house…[and 
it] is simply implausible that an intruder forfeits his right to life by invading another’s privacy” 
(Kaufman 27). Both the medieval regulation of violence and the common law tradition of a duty to 
retreat seek to protect innocent human life and prevent further violence, while a right to self-
defense, especially under the new “Stand Your Ground Laws,” seems to do the opposite. Jesus’s 
teachings also seem to support this idea that all people should be treated with kindness, and that no 
attack should be met with further violence, even if in self-defense. Therefore, the recent rejection of 
the duty to retreat is a departure from both Jesus’s teachings and historical jurisprudence. 
Judgment and Punishment in the Modern U.S. Legal System 
 Similarly to the late Medieval English legal system, the United States legal system uses 
judges and juries to determine an accused defendant’s guilt or innocence. This again is dependent 
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on human judgment. However, as mentioned previously, there is also a significant dependence on 
the facts presented in a case, instead of purely on human judgment. In this way, the United States 
legal system has somewhat skirted Jesus’s prohibitions of the use of human judgment, though it is 
still clear that judges are given some leeway in interpreting the laws, as other judges can have the 
same case presented to them and make a different judgment decision. Because of this, judges – and, 
in many cases, juries – parallel the eschatological God, who comes to determine the wickedness of 
humans and punish the evildoers.  
 Punishment in the modern legal system is also similar to that of the medieval legal system; 
however, it still relies on human judgment in many cases to determine the severity of the 
punishment. Jesus does not condone humans violently punishing other humans in Matthew, but the 
use of violent punishment by the modern American legal system emphasizes the struggle of the 
Founding Fathers and of modern legal scholars and legislators to practically apply Jesus’s 
teachings. There is a clear belief that crime, especially violent crime, cannot go unpunished on 
Earth, despite whatever consequences may be waiting for evildoers in the eschatological period, as 
this would lead to a kind of anarchy.  
Punishment in the United States generally serves retributive or deterrent purposes and has a 
wide range of severity, reaching up to the death penalty, which is allowed by 30 states, or the 
majority of the nation (“Facts about the Death Penalty”). However, there is evidence that the use of 
the death penalty is decreasing. The chart below depicts this decrease: 
	   	   Koch 58 
	  	  
(“Facts about the Death Penalty”) 
 
Clearly, since its peak in 1999, the use of the death penalty as punishment has significantly 
decreased to just over a quarter of the number of executions as there were only twenty years ago. 
Additionally, the number of death penalty sentences per year across the country has dramatically 
decreased from 295 in 1998 to only 42 in 2018 (“Facts about the Death Penalty”). In this regard, the 
United States legal system has shifted away from humans punishing other humans with violence 
and toward the ideals of Jesus’s expectations. It is clear that the United States courts have also 
shifted further away from using human judgment as the basis for determining guilt or innocence and 
instead rely more heavily on science and facts, such as DNA evidence. In fact, since 1973, there 
have been more than 160 exonerations of people sentenced to the death penalty. According to the 
Death Penalty Information Center, “[f]rom 1973-1999, there was an average of [three] exonerations 
per year [and from] 2000-2011, there was an average of [five] exonerations per year” (“Facts about 
the Death Penalty”). Technological advances in the past two decades, especially in the use of DNA 
evidence, have led to the exonerations of many defendants who are sentenced to death. 
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Perhaps another reason that fewer convicted criminals are being sentenced to death is that 
there is evidence that suggests that the death penalty does not truly serve its purpose as a crime 
deterrent, as the South has the highest murder rate of any region in the U.S., but it also has the 
highest execution rate of 80%, compared to the Northeast with only 1% of all executions and the 
lowest murder rate in the U.S. (“Facts about the Death Penalty”). Therefore, it is logical that the 
United States is moving away from the use of the death penalty as a punishment for violent crime 
because it does not serve the true purpose of punishment. Even further, public opinion seems to be 
turning against the death penalty as a sentence for violent crime. In a 2010 poll conducted by Lake 
Research Partners, 61% of voters said that they would choose a punishment – each of which were 
nonviolent and noncapital punishments – other than the death penalty for murder, while another 
“2009 poll commissioned by DPIC found that police chiefs ranked the death penalty last among 
ways to reduce violent crime” (“Facts about the Death Penalty”). It is clear that the beliefs of a 
majority of the population are in conflict with the continued use of the death penalty, much as 
Jesus’s teachings are against the use of the death penalty or any violent punishment by humans. 
Even the Supreme Court has cited the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society” (Trop v. Dulles) in several cases that suggests, at least in some 
circumstances, that capital punishment is not appropriate or in keeping with the current standard of 
decency. Some of these cases include Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), which prohibited the 
execution of defendants under sixteen years old at the time of their crime (Thompson v. Oklahoma); 
Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), which prohibited the execution of those over 15 but under 18 at the 
time of their crime, thus expanding on the Thompson decision (Stanford v. Kentucky); Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002), which prohibited the execution of mentally retarded defendants (Atkins v. 
Virginia); and Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), which not only prohibited the execution of a minor 
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without examining his mitigating circumstances, but also, in his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan states that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in all instances, thus 
furthering the evolution of the standard of decency to include all death sentences (Eddings v. 
Oklahoma). This shows that modern jurisprudence has moved away from the use of the death 
penalty. 
 In fact, in reference to the ineffectiveness of deterrence and the debate on the severity of 
punishments, over the last one hundred and fifty years “punishment has grown milder and milder” 
(Bittner and Platt 93), thus suggesting a movement away from the	  violent extremes of the death 
penalty and capital punishment toward the more Christian moral ideals of rehabilitation and the 
protection of human life. According to Bittner and Platt: 
[Penal reform] set out by abolishing the stock, the branding iron, and the gallows, instituted 
incarceration as the virtually universal form of sanctioning criminal offences, and proceeded 
slowly to improve the conditions of life in prisons…one [reform] after another, the pain in 
punishment withered away. (Bittner and Platt 95) 
This shows that over time, especially during the last two centuries, punishment has evolved to be a 
more decent and less violent expression of human judgment in the United States. Clearly, this has 
moved society closer to the expectations of Jesus, though the practicality of these expectations still 
places them out of reach in the United States legal system. Bittner and Platt also state: 
 Of course, [the United States] continue[s] to punish offenders…with the solemnity that 
ordinarily attaches to traditions. There is, however, hardly any doubt that this is done, by and 
large, with misgivings and the punitive approach is abandoned readily at the slightest hint of 
an alternative, while at the same time the suggestion that [the nation] punish harshly, say by 
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mutilation, would certainly be repudiated even against perfect evidence of its deterrent 
effect. (Bittner and Platt 96) 
This analysis further suggests that the United States legal system has developed a reluctance to use 
violent punishment when there are alternative options available, like incarceration or rehabilitation, 
both of which more closely align with Jesus’s teachings in Matthew while remaining practical for 
modern, real-world applications. The struggle between the morality expressed by Jesus’s teachings 
in Matthew and the practicality of the applications of those teachings serves to exemplify the 
challenge facing the legal system and its leaders, as well as to potentially explain the shift in 
penological practices over the last one hundred and fifty years, which has “resulted in an internal 
pacification of the modern world on a scale unknown in human history” (Bittner and Platt 98), 
much like the peacemaking Jesus expects from his followers would have resulted in.    
Conclusion 
In the most recent penological debates, there is “a schism between some who take the 
psychologically oriented ‘treatment’ approach and others, who advocate an ‘old fashioned’ punitive 
approach” (Bittner and Platt 98). However, it is clear that a significant portion of the United States 
populace and legal field believe that there is a societal “evolving standard of decency,” as society 
pushes back against capital punishment and the death sentence. While there are some exceptions to 
society’s rejection of violence, such as the recent expansions to Castle Doctrine across half of the 
country, the United States legal system has seemed to develop a more pacifistic approach in dealing 
with violent crimes than has ever been used throughout all of history. This “evolving standard of 
decency” seems to be edging the United States ever closer to the ideals and expectations expressed 
by Jesus’s teachings on violence and self-defense in the Gospel of Matthew. If this is truly the type 
of legal system that modern jurisprudence seeks to establish, Jesus’s moral expectations, while 
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certainly challenging to meet, may not prove to be entirely impractical in terms of how the system 
prevents violent crime and deals with those who do commit such acts. In fact, if the justice system 
were to shift even further toward a rehabilitative approach, the United States legal system would 
certainly be meeting Jesus’s expectations of loving one’s enemies, and perhaps in turn would help 
form a more peaceful and kind society – one that Jesus would be proud to call “perfect, as [our] 
heavenly Father is perfect” (Matthew 5:48). 
  
	   	   Koch 63 
Works Cited 
Attridge, Harold W, Wayne A. Meeks, and Jouette M. Bassler. The Harpercollins Study Bible: New 
Revised Standard Version, with the Apocryphal/deuterocanonical Books. San Francisco, 
CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2006. Print. 
Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304. Supreme Court of the United States. 2002. Supreme Court 
Collection. Justia, n.d. Web. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/536/304%26amp. 
Bisson, T. N. “The ‘Feudal Revolution.’” Past & Present, no. 142, 1994, pp. 6–42. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/651195. 
Bittner, Egon, and Anthony M. Platt. “The Meaning of Punishment.” Issues in Criminology, vol. 2, 
no. 1, 1966, pp. 79–99. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/42909549. 
Broude, Ronald. “Revenge and Revenge Tragedy in Renaissance England.” Renaissance Quarterly, 
vol. 28, no. 1, 1975, pp. 38–58. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2860421. 
Carpenter, Catherine L. "Of the Enemy within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense." Marquette 
Law Review, vol. 86, no. 4, Spring 2003, pp. 653-700. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-
org.brockport.idm.oclc.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/marqlr86&i=667. 
Carruthers, Leo. “Canon Law and the Judicial System in Late Medieval Society.” Brewminate, 15 
May 2015, brewminate.com/canon-law-and-the-judicial-system-in-late-medieval-society/. 
Cheng, Cheng, and Mark Hoekstra. “Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate 
Violence? Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine.” The Journal of Human 
Resources, vol. 48, no. 3, 2013, pp. 821–853. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23799103. 
Davies, W D, and Dale C. Allison. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According 
to Saint Matthew. London: T & T Clark International, 2004. Print. 
	   	   Koch 64 
Eddings v. Oklahoma. 455 U.S. 104. Supreme Court of the United States. 1982. Supreme Court 
Collection. Justia, n.d. Web. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/455/104/. 
 “Facts about the Death Penalty.” Death Penalty Information Center, 3 May 2019, 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
France, R. T. The Gospel According to Matthew: An Introduction and Commentary. Inter-Varsity 
Press, 2008. 
Garry, Patrick M. “The Myth of Separation: America's Historical Experience with Church and 
State.” Hofstra Law Review, vol. 33, no. 2, 2004, pp. 475–500., 
scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/4. 
Glaeser, Edward L., and Andrei Shleifer. “Legal Origins.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 117, no. 4, 2002, pp. 1193–1229. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4132477. 
Jason, Peter D. “The Courts Christian in Medieval England.” The Catholic Lawyer, vol. 37, no. 4, 
1997, pp. 339–358., scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol37/iss4/4/. 
Kaufman, Whitley. “Is There a ‘Right’ to Self‐Defense?” Criminal Justice Ethics, vol. 23, no. 1, 
2004, pp. 20–32., doi:10.1080/0731129x.2004.9992157. 
McAuley, Finbarr. “Canon Law and the End of the Ordeal.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 
26, no. 3, 2006, pp. 473–513. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3877006. 
McGlynn, Sean. “Violence and the Law in Medieval Englad.” History Today, vol. 58, no. 4, Apr. 
2008, pp. 53-59. EBSCOhost, 
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hus&AN=504450167&site=ehost-live. 
“Self Defense and ‘Stand Your Ground.’” National Conference of State Legislatures, 27 July 2018, 
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/self-defense-and-stand-your-ground.aspx.  
	   	   Koch 65 
“Self-Defense Law: Overview.” Findlaw, criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/self-defense-
overview.html. 
Sherman, Charles P. “A Brief History of Medieval Roman Canon Law in England.” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, vol. 68, no. 3, 1920, pp. 233–258., 
doi:10.2307/3694215. 
Stanford v. Kentucky. 492 U.S. 361. Supreme Court of the United States. 1989. Supreme Court 
Collection. Legal Information Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/492/361. 
Thompson v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815. Supreme Court of the United States. 1987. Supreme Court 
Collection. Legal Information Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/487/815. 
Trop v. Dulles. 356 U.S. 86. Supreme Court of the United States. 1958. Supreme Court Collection. 
Legal Information Inst., Cornell U. Law School, n.d. Web. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/356/86. 	  
 
